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Abstract
The main purpose of the paper is to extend the Schumpeterian growth
theory to the case of a weightless economy. Basically, we consider a for-
malization of knowledge accumulation which is slightly different from the
Aghion-Howitt’s one. First, in the line of these authors, we use this for-
malization in a standard model, i.e. a model of tangible economy in which
intermediate goods embody knowledge. Second, we use it in a model of
weightless economy, i.e. a model in which knowledge (or information) goods
replace intermediate goods. In this framework, we consider an equilibrium
with Cournot competition to overcome the problems caused by the non-
convexity of technology. Then, we can extend the Schumpeterian growth
analysis; in particular, we study the creative destruction mechanism with
knowledge goods. Finally, we analyse the case in which patents directly
protect new knowledge.
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1 Introduction
Two paradigms in innovation-based growth models are today available. First,
the models with an expanding variety of products (Romer [20], Grossman and
Helpman [10]). Second, the models with quality improving innovations, and
in particular the Schumpeterian growth theory developed by P. Aghion and P.
Howitt [1, 2]. A common feature of these models is that new knowledge (i.e.
new ideas) is embodied in private intermediate goods, and that all authors
consider an equilibrium in which these goods are monopolized. In the present
paper, we call tangible economy the case in which these intermediate goods
exist.
However, in the new technology sectors, these intermediate goods gener-
ally disappear because new ideas are embodied in knowledge (or information)
goods which have the same essential property than knowledge: they are non
rival 1. Here we call weightless economy the case where intermediate goods
are replaced by knowledge goods in which ideas are embodied.
The main purpose of this paper is to extend the Schumpeterian paradigm
to the case of a weightless economy 2. The basic difficulty is that we have
to propose a new concept of equilibrium. Indeed, since intermediate goods
have disappeared, we cannot continue to assume that an innovator obtains
a flow of monopoly profits on this type of good. On the contrary, we must
assume that knowledge goods (or, possibly, knowledge) are directly priced.
Because of the public good nature of knowledge goods, new questions arise.
In particular, since knowledge is used as an input in production processes,
1For instance, S. Scotchmer [25] writes: “By information goods, we usually mean com-
puter software and entertainment products stored in digital form, such as music. Infor-
mation goods have a feature that sets them apart from ordinary private goods. They
are public goods in the technical sense meant by economists: use by one person does not
preclude use by any other person and does not cost additional resources, except the small
cost of distributing them. That is, the use of such a good is non rival”. On this point, see
also Quah [18, 19].
2One can find several arguments in favor of the Schumpeterian paradigm. See for
instance Aghion and Howitt [3].
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technologies are non convex, and a competitive equilibrium does not exist.
Thus we have to construct an equilibrium in which firms are able to buy
knowledge, that is to say in which their profits remain strictly positive once
private inputs (labor, capital, . . . ) are paid.
Our first stage is to present a formalization of knowledge accumulation
which is slightly different from the Aghion-Howitt’s one. Basically, this analy-
sis is in the line of these authors. As Aghion and Howitt, we assume a Poisson
arrival rate of new ideas. However, we propose a different formalization of
the intersectoral spillovers: we assume that when a new idea occurs in a sec-
tor, the increase in knowledge is a function of the total stock of knowledge
accumulated in the economy. This leads to very simple expressions for the
law of motion of knowledge. We use this formalization of knowledge accumu-
lation to study a tangible economy. In a first stage, we analyze a standard
equilibrium in which intermediate goods are monopolized, and we find again
the basic results of Aghion and Howitt, especially the fact the laissez-faire
growth may be greater or lower than the optimal one. In a second stage, we
determine the system of prices which supports the firs-best optimum. To do
it, we assume that knowledge is directly priced (independently of the inter-
mediate goods in which it is embodied) and we compute the social value of
each unit of knowledge. This methodological step gives us the basic tools
which allow to analyze later the economy with knowledge goods.
Afterwards, we extend the model to the case of a weightless economy.
Then, to solve the problems raised by the non-convexity of technology, we
assume that firms compete “à la Cournot” on the markets of consumption
goods. In this case, they get positive profits which are used to buy the
knowledge goods. At the same time, we introduce a market for knowledge in
which we assume imperfect exclusion. Then, we can in particular examine
what becomes the creative destruction mechanism in a weightless economy
context: this case occurs when innovators have a monopoly on knowledge
goods. It can be compared to the situation in which property rights are
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directly put on ideas.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the formalisa-
tion of knowledge accumulation, we distinguish tangible economy and weight-
less economy, we analyse the standard (“à la Aghion-Howitt”) equilibrium in
the first one, and we calculate the expression of the social value of one unit of
knowledge. In section 3, we study the equilibrium with Cournot competition
and free entry in the weightless economy. We conclude in section 4.
2 From intermediate goods (“tangible economy”)
to knowledge goods (“weightless economy”)
In this section, we present a model which can describe two types of economies,
that we call tangible (“standard”) and weightless (“new”). The common fea-
ture of these economies is that they have the same research sector which
produces new ideas, that are non-rival goods. The basic difference is that in
the standard economy ideas are embodied in intermediate goods (i.e. private
goods), whereas in the new economy they are embodied in knowledge goods
that are also non-rival, and thus that can be assimilated to ideas themselves.
2.1 The model
2.1.1 The research sector
In both economies, a fixed flow of labor (L) has two competing uses at each
date t : it can be used to produce the final good (Y ), and it can be used in
research. That is :
L = LYt + L
A
t , (1)
where LYt is the amount of labor used in the final good sector and LAt is the
amount of labor used in research.
There is a continuum of sectors, each sector being denoted by j, j ∈ [0, 1].
Each sector j is characterized by a level of knowledge Ajt, and it has its
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own research activity. This activity produces news ideas, that are successive
increases in knowledge. As P. Aghion and P. Howitt [2], we want to formal-
ize the intersectoral spillovers, that it to say the fact that new technologies
“diffuse gradually, through a process in which one sector gets ideas from the
experience of others”. As in their model, we assume that ”the innovations
themselves draw on the same pool of shared technological knowledge”. But
we depart from their assumption along with the state of this knowledge is
represented by the ”leading-edge” technology whose the productivity para-
meter is Amaxt . Here we assume that the common pool is represented by the
total stock of knowledge in the economy, At =
∫ 1
0
Ajtdj. Formally, we make
two assumptions.
First, as Aghion and Howitt, we assume that the Poisson arrival rate of
new ideas in each sector j is λLAjt, λ > 0, where LAjt is the amount of labor
devoted to research in this sector.
Second, we make a very simple assumption to express the increase in
knowledge when a new idea occurs. We denote by τ(j) the index of ideas in
sector j(τ(j) = 1, 2, 3, . . .) and by At(τ(j)) the level of total knowledge when
the level of knowledge is Aτ(j) in sector j. Our basic assumption is
Aτ+1(j) − Aτ(j) = σAt(τ(j)), σ > 0. (2)
It says that, when a new idea occurs in sector j, the increase in knowledge
is a linear function of the total knowledge in the economy3.
These two assumptions allow to obtain very simple laws of motion of the
average knowledge in each sector j, and in the whole economy. One gets :
A˙jt = λσL
A
jtAt and A˙t = λσL
A
t At. (3)
The proof is the following. Consider a time interval (t, t+∆t). If knowl-
edge in sector j is Ajt at date t, its value at (t+∆t) is a random variable Ajt+∆t
3This assumption is a simple formalization of the intersectoral spillovers. It will allow
to highlight the working of the market for knowledge. That is why we use this type of
model rather than the ones of Grossman and Helpman [9], or O’Donoghue and Zweimüller
[6] for instance.
4
which can take two values : Ajt+∆t = Ajt+σAt with probability λLAjt∆t (one
innovation during the time interval) and Ajt with probability 1−λLAjt∆t (no
innovation). One gets E(Ajt+∆t) = (Ajt + σAt)λLAjt∆t + Ajt(1− λLAjt∆t) =
Ajt + λσL
A
jtAt∆t. When ∆t tends to zero, we have E(A˙jt) = λσLAjtAt. Sum-
ming on j, one gets in average the law of motion of At given by (3).
Let us note that the technology described by (3) displays constant returns
to scale with respect to the private input, i.e labor, and increasing ones with
respect to all inputs, i.e labor and knowledge, taken together.
Remark : more generally, one can assume that the Poisson arrival rate
of new ideas in sector j is φ(LAjt), φ′ > 0, and that Aτ+1(j) − Aτ(j) =
ψ[At(τ(j))], ψ
′ > 0. Thus the laws of motion of knowledge are A˙jt = ψ(At)φ(LAjt)
in sector j, and A˙t = ψ(At)
∫ 1
0
φ(LAjt)dj in the whole economy. Several cases
can be envisaged. Let us consider some of them. If φ(LAjt) = λLAjt and
ψ(At) = σAt, we recover the previous case. If φ(LAjt) = λLAjt/Lt (now,
Lt can be growing) and ψ(At) = σAt, one gets A˙t = λσAtLAt /Lt, that
leads to an endogenous growth model without scale effects. Assume now
φ(LAjt) = ζtL
A
jt, ψ(At) = σA
γ
t , γ < 1, and ζt = λ(LAt )δ−1, λ > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1),
where ζt is a productivity factor which is external to each sector. One gets
A˙jt = λσ(L
A
t )
δ−1LAjt(At)
γ and A˙t = λσ(LAt )δ(At)γ, that leads to a semi-
endogenous growth model: see for instance Jones and Williams [11].
In the following text, we use the simple specification given in (3) and we
provide complementary results in remarks.
2.1.2 Tangible (“standard”) economy versus weightless (“new”) econ-
omy
Now we can distinguish the two types of economies.
In the tangible economy, ideas are embodied in intermediate goods. In
this case, we can keep the formalization of Aghion and Howitt. The final
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good is produced according to
Yt = (L
Y
t )
1−α
∫ 1
0
Ajt(xjt)
αdj , 0 < α < 1 (4)
where xjt is the quantity of intermediate good j used at date t.
Each intermediate good j is produced from final output according to
xjt =
yjt
Ajt
, j ∈ [0, 1], (5)
where yjt is the quantity of final output used to produce xjt.
Finally we have
Yt = Lct +
∫ 1
0
yjtdj, (6)
where ct is the consumption of the representative household.
In the weightless economy, there are no intermediate goods with signifi-
cant positive cost and ideas are embodied in knowledge goods which can be
produced at zero cost. In this case, we assume that the technology in the
final good sector is
Yt = L
Y
t
∫ 1
0
Ajtdj = AtL
Y
t . (7)
Note that, in accordance with the replication argument, we assume that
(4) and (7) display constant returns to scale with respect to the private (i.e.
rival) input(s): labor and intermediate goods in the tangible economy, only
labor in the weightless economy. On the other hand, in both cases, these
technologies display increasing returns to scale with respect to rival and non
rival inputs taken jointly. Since there are no intermediate goods, the whole
final good is used for consumption:
Yt = Lct. (8)
Finally, in the tangible economy and in the weightless one, preferences
are given by
U =
∫ ∞
0
c1−εt − 1
1− ε e
−ρtdt, ε > 0, ε 6= 0, ρ > 0. (9)
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2.2 Economy with intermediate goods (“tangible econ-
omy”)
Here we analyse two types of equilibria. The first one, that we call the
standard equilibrium, is a direct extension of the analysis of Aghion and
Howitt. The second one, that we call the first-best, allows to exhibit the
system of prices which supports the first-best optimum. It allows to present
several elements that will be useful when we analyze the weightless economy.
2.2.1 Standard equilibrium
The price of good Y is normalized to one, and we denote by wt, rt and qjt,
the wage, the interest rate and the price of the intermediate j. The financial
market, the labor market and the market of good Y are perfectly competitive.
As Aghion and Howitt, we assume that “the firm that succeeds in innovating
can monopolize the intermediate sector until replaced by the next innovator
[2]”. Formally, a standard equilibrium (“à la Aghion-Howitt”) is such that:
- in the final sector, firms maximize the profit piYt = (LYt )1−α
∫ 1
0
Ajtx
α
jtdj−
wtL
Y
t −
∫ 1
0
qjtxjtdj,
- in each intermediate sector j, the monopoly maximizes the profit pijt =
qjtxjt − yjt,
- in the research activity, the free entry condition is wt = λΠjt, where
Πjt =
∫∞
t
pijse
− ∫ st (ru+λLAju)duds is the sum of the present values of the
expected profits in sector j at date t.
The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 In the standard (“à la Aghion-Howitt”) equilibrium, rates of
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growth, quantities and prices are the following:
gA = gY =
λαL− ρ
ε− 1 + (1 + α)/σ
LA =
gY
λσ
, LY = L− LA, xj = x = α 11−αLY , ∀j
wt = (1− α)α 2α1−αAt , qjt = qt = At
α
, ∀j
where gz is the rate of growth of any variable z.
Proof: see appendix A.
It can be shown (see Proposition 2 below) that, at optimum, we have
gY = (λσL− ρ)/ε and x = α1/(1−α)LY . As usual, the standard equilibrium is
not optimal. In particular, as in the basic formulation of Aghion and Howitt,
the laissez-faire growth may be greater or lower than the optimal one.
Remark : let us consider the case in which the Poisson arrival rate of new
ideas in sector j is φ(LAjt) = λAjt/Lt, where population Lt grows at the exoge-
nous rate n.Moreover, we continue to assume that Aτ+1(j)−Aτ (j) = σAt(τ(j))
(see (2)). Thus we know that in average the law of motion of knowledge is
A˙jt = λσAtL
A
jt/Lt in sector j and A˙t = λσAtLAt /Lt in the whole economy
(see the final remark in 2.1.1 above). In this case, one gets gc = gA =
(λα − ρ)/[ε − 1 + (1 − α)/σ], gY = gc + n, LAt /Lt = gA/λσ, xjt = xt =
α
2
1−αLYt , wt = (1−α)α
2α
1−αAt, and qjt = qt = At/α. Basically, there is now no
scale effects in this “à la Aghion-Howitt” equilibrium.
2.2.2 Welfare, social value of innovations and first-best prices
Now we depart from the usual analysis made in growth theory. The main
purpose of this sub-section is to exhibit the system of prices which supports
the first-best optimum of the standard economy. The basic point is to com-
pute the optimal unit price of knowledge, that is to say to provide a detailed
expression of the social value of one unit of knowledge. We see later that this
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analysis will be useful to study the weightless economy. We introduce two
modifications with respect to the standard equilibrium.
First, we complete the markets by assuming that ideas are priced. Second,
having in mind the first theorem of welfare, we assume that the markets of
private goods (final good, labor, but also intermediate goods) are perfectly
competitive, and that ideas are priced at their optimal level.
As previously, we normalise to one the price of good Y, and wt, rt and
qjt are the wage, the interest rate and the price of the intermediate j. We
know that each unit of knowledge is simultaneously used (ideas are non-
rival goods) by three types of firms, which belong to the three sectors of the
economy: the final good sector (see (4)), the research sector (see (3)) and the
intermediate goods sector (see(5): these goods embody the knowledge). We
denote respectively by vYjt, vijt and vxjt, the marginal profitability of one unit of
knowledge Aj at date t in the final sector, the sector i, and the intermediate
goods sector. Then, vjt = vYjt+
∫ 1
0
vijtdi+v
x
jt is the total marginal profitability
of one unit of knowledge Aj: it is the instantaneous social marginal value of
this unit. Indeed, since each unit of knowledge is simultaneously used by
three sectors, this social value is the sum of the marginal profitabilities of
this unit in these sectors.
Since ideas are infinitely-lived, we can define Vjt =
∫∞
t
vjse
− ∫ st rududs as
the social value of one unit of knowledge Aj at date t. Differentiating the
expression of Vjt with respect to time gives the usual condition rt = vjt/Vjt+
gVjt .
The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the tangible economy, the first-best rates of growth, quan-
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tities, and prices are (upper-script o is used for optimum):
goA = g
o
Y =
λσL− ρ
ε
(LA)o =
goY
λσ
, (LY )o = L− (LA)o, xo = α 11−α (LY )o
wot = (1− α)α
α
1−αAt, q
o
t = At, v
o = L(1− α)α α1−α , V o = (1− α)α
α
1−α
λσ
Proof: see appendix B.
These results confirm that in the standard equilibrium studied in 2.1.1,
there are two market failures with respect to the first-best one: first, in-
termediate goods are sold by monopolies; second, markets are incomplete,
since knowledge has no price. We have now the main tools to construct an
equilibrium in the weightless economy.
Remark : let us again consider the case in which A˙jt = λσAtLAjt/Lt,
A˙t = λσAtL
A
t /Lt, and L˙t/Lt = n. Then one gets goc = goA = (λσ− ρ)/ε, goY =
goc+n, (L
A
t )
o/Lt = g
o
A/λσ, x
o
t = α
1
1−α (LYt )
o, wot = (1−α)α
α
1−αAt, q
o
t = At, v
o
t =
(1−α)α α1−αLt, V ot = (1−α)α
α
1−αLt/λσ. There are two differencies with respect
to the results given in proposition 2: scale effects disappear and the social
value of one unit of knowledge increases at the same rate than population.
2.3 Economy with knowledge goods: first-best and ba-
sic problems
Let us now consider the weightless economy. In order to characterize the
optimal path, one maximizes (9) under (1)-(3)-(7)-(8). Clearly the solutions
are the same as in the tangible economy, except that intermediate goods
disappear. Thus one gets gY = gc = gA = (λσL − ρ)/ε, LA = gY /λσ, and
LY = L− LA.
Using the methodology presented in 2.2.2, we can easily obtain the first-
best prices.
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In the final sector, the profit is piYt = AtLYt − wtLYt . One gets wt = At, and
the marginal profitability of one unit of knowledge is vYt = ∂piYt /∂At = LYt .
In any research sector j, the profit is piAjt = VjtλσAtLAjt − wtLAjt. The free
entry condition is wt = VjtλσAt. Since wt = At, one gets Vjt = Vt = 1/λσ,
that implies gV = 0. The marginal profitability of one unit of knowledge is
vAjt = ∂pi
A
jt/∂At = VtλσL
A
jt.
From the representative household’s behavior and the arbitrage condition
between financial market and research, one has at steady-state r = ρ +
εgY = v
Y /V + vA/V. Since vY /V = λσLY and vA/V = λσLA, one gets
gY = (λσL− ρ)/ε, which is the optimal rate of growth.
We can now come back to the two expressions of the social value of knowl-
edge, that is to say to the optimal price of knowledge in both economies. In
the tangible economy, it is the sum of the marginal profitabilities of knowl-
edge in three sectors: the final good sector, the research sector, and the
intermediate goods sector. In the weightless economy, intermediate goods
disappear. They are replaced by knowledge goods which are non-rival, i.e.
which are consubstantial with knowledge itself. That is why the social value
of knowledge is now the sum of only two terms: the marginal profitabilities
of knowledge in the final good sector and in the research sector.
The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In the weightless economy, the first-best rates of growth,
quantities and prices are:
goA = g
o
Y =
λσL− ρ
ε
(LA)o =
goY
λσ
, (LY )o = L− (LA)o
wot = At , v
o = L , V o =
1
λσ
.
This equilibrium is formally very simple, but it is not realistic. Assume
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for example that patents are given to the inventors of new ideas 4. First,
in order to implement the first-best optimum, we must assume that these
inventors are able to identify who uses an idea, and to exclude those who do
not pay.
Second, in a competitive economy, firms which use ideas are unable to
pay for them, because the payment of private factors exhaust their revenue.
Thus this equilibrium exists only if research is totally publicly funded.
These two types of difficulties come from the fact that ideas and knowl-
edge goods are non rival, and generally only partially excludable. In partic-
ular, the non-rivalness property explains why the technologies of production
of final good and of innovations display constant returns to scale with respect
to private inputs and increasing ones with respect to all inputs (privates ones
and knowledge) taken together: see (3), (4) and (7).
Remark : if A˙jt = λσAtLAjt/Lt, A˙t = λσAtLAt /Lt, and L˙t/Lt = n, one
gets goc = goA = (λσ− ρ)/ε, goY = goc + n, (LAt )o/Lt = goA/λσ,wot = At, vot = Lt,
and V ot = Lt/λσ. Again, scale effects disappear and the social value of one
unit of knowledge increases at the same rate than population.
3 Equilibrium in the weightless economy
In the previous section, we have analyzed two types of equilibria: the stan-
dard (“à la Aghion-Howitt”) one in which there are monopolies on interme-
diate goods, and the first-best one in which knowledge is directly priced at
its optimal level. Unfortunately, when one considers the weightless economy,
none of them can be used: the standard equilibrium is unusable because
intermediate goods have disappeared, and the first-best one is not realistic.
Thus we have to propose a new concept of equilibrium.
We have seen that the main difficulties come from the public good nature
4An alternative case would be to give patents directly to new knowledge goods. Both
cases will be considered in sections 3.2 and 3.3.
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of knowledge which rises two types of questions. First, we have to construct
an equilibrium in which the firms which use knowledge as an input get strictly
positive profits on the sales of consumption goods in order to buy knowledge.
The simple idea of the model analyzed below is to assume that these prof-
its are earned on the markets of consumption goods, which are imperfectly
competitive. Second, we have to explain how is organized the market for
knowledge.
We consider a disaggregated version of the weightless economy presented
in 2.1.2. There is now a continuum of consumption goods, and each good is
produced by an endogenous number of firms. Each firm engages simultane-
ously in research, and we assume that firms compete “à la Cournot” on the
markets of consumption goods. Since the price of these goods is higher than
the unit cost, each firm obtains a positive profit which is used to buy the
knowledge goods (or ideas themselves). Then we study two polar cases. If
innovators have a monopoly on knowledge goods, we get a “destructive cre-
ation” equilibrium, which can be compared with the equilibrium studied by
Aghion and Howitt in the tangible economy. If property rights are directly
put on new ideas, one gets an equilibrium which is noticeably different from
the previous one. In all cases, we determine the number of firms in each
consumption goods sector which results from the free entry condition5.
3.1 Disaggregated model and agents behavior
3.1.1 Model
As previously, there is a continuum of sectors. Now each sector j, j ∈ [0, 1],
produces a specific consumption good. We choose this differentiated goods
structure in order to exhibit a demand function on each market (see (11)
below) and to introduce imperfect competition. Each individual is endowed
5A possible extension of this analysis would be to link this model of weightless economy
with the patent-design literature, as it is done by O’Donoghue and Zweimüller [6] for a
model of tangible economy.
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with one unit of labor and preferences are given by
U =
∫ ∞
0
[
∫ 1
0
(cjt)
θ](1−ε)/θ − 1
1− ε e
−ρtdt, ε > 0, ρ > 0, 0 < θ < 1 (10)
where cjt is the consumption of differentiated good j.
In each sector j, there are Nj(nj = 1, . . . , Nj) firms. Each firm nj engages
simultaneously in research and in production. We denote by Anjt the stock of
knowledge produced by firm nj until date t, by Ajt =
∑Nj
nj=1
Anjt, the stock
of knowledge produced in sector j, and by At =
∫ 1
0
Ajtdj the total stock of
knowledge.
Inside each firm nj, new ideas occur under the two assumptions presented
in 2.1.1. First, the Poisson arrival rate of these ideas is λLAnjt, λ > 0, where
LAnjt the amount of labor devoted to research in this firm. Second, when
a new idea occurs in firm nj, the increase in knowledge inside this firm is
σA
nj
t , σ > 0, where A
nj
t is the stock of knowledge used by the firm (we
have Anjt ≤ At). Thus, as explained in 2.1.1, one gets in average the law of
motion A˙njt = λσLAnjtA
nj
t , for all nj. The technology of production of good
j by firm nj is Ynjt = A
nj
t L
Y
njt
, where LYnjt is the amount of labor devoted to
production.
If Anjt = At (i.e. all firms use the whole stock of knowledge, that will be
the case at equilibrium : see Proposition 4), one gets A˙jt =
∑Nj
nj=1
A˙njt =
λσLAjtAt in each sector j, and A˙t =
∫ 1
0
A˙jtdj = λσL
A
t At in the whole economy.
In the same way, the total production of good j is Yjt =
∑Nj
nj=1
Ynjt = AL
Y
jt.
Finally, one has Yjt = Lcjt and
∫ 1
0
[
∑Nj
nj=1
(LYnjt+L
A
njt
)]dj = LYt +L
A
t = L.
Let us remark that in the symmetric case (Yj = Y, ∀j) one finds again
the aggregated model presented in section 2.1. Thus, the optimal path is the
same: see section 2.3.
3.1.2 Basic assumptions and market for knowledge
We normalize the price of labor to one, and we denote by pjt and rt the
price of consumption good j and the interest rate. We know that each firm
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nj has two activities. First, it sells a quantity Ynjt of good j. Since there is
imperfect competition on this market, the firm gets a strictly positive profit,
pjtYnjt − LYnjt, on this activity. Second, it gets an additional profit on its
research activity. The expected value of this profit is V˜tλσAtLAnjt − LAnjt,
where V˜t is the market price of one unit of knowledge. We analyze later two
cases in which V˜t take two different values. Either firms sell knowledge goods
which have a finite life in average, as intermediate goods in the standard
Aghion and Howitt’s model. Either property rights can be directly given to
ideas which are infinitely-lived.
Now we have to explain how the market for knowledge works. To simplify
we assume that firms directly exchange units of knowledge. These goods are
non rival and they are also differentiated and perfect substitutes, as it can
be seen in (3) and (7) where units of knowledge can be permuted. We make
three assumptions.
First, we assume that each firms nj is characterized by an instantaneous
marginal willingness to pay for knowledge, vnj(A
nj
t ), which is a decreasing
function of Anjt (see equation (15) below for the analytical expression of this
function). Second, we assume for a while (see remark below) that there is
perfect exclusion : non-buyers cannot copy the knowledge and buyers cannot
resell it. Thus each firm can be considered as an independent market for the
sellers of knowledge, and different firms generally pay different prices. In this
model, there are
∫ 1
0
Njdj independent micro-markets. Third, since units of
knowledge are perfect substitutes, we assume that each micro-market works
as the standard competitive market for an homogenous good, where the
total supply is At. Thus, on the micro-market of firm nj, the unit price of
knowledge, vnjt, adjusts so that the firm uses the total stock of knowledge :
one gets Anjt = At and vnjt = vnj(At), for all nj. Since knowledge is non-rival,
the price received by any seller for one unit of knowledge is the sum of the
prices paid by firms which use this unit, that is vt =
∫ 1
0
∑Nj
nj=1
vnj(At)dj. In
other words, different firms generally pay different unit prices, but the price
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received by the sellers is the same for all units of knowledge.
An important point here is that, under the assumption of perfect exclu-
sion, the market for non-rival (but substitute) units of knowledge leads to
the optimal price. Indeed, vt is the social value of one unit of knowledge, i.e.
the sum of the user’s marginal profits from this unit.
Remark : partial exclusion
We have now to take into account the problem of exclusion, which is at the
heart of the weightless economy. To introduce partial exclusion, we relax
the second assumption above, and we use the following simple formalization.
We assume that, for any firm nj, each unit of knowledge used by this firm
has a probability φ , 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, to be paid to the seller. Thus, in average,
the seller perceives φvnj(At) from this firm, and the average payment re-
ceived from all firms for one unit of knowledge is v˜t =
∫ 1
0
∑Nj
nj=1
φvnj(At)dj =
φ
∫ 1
0
∑Nj
nj=1
vnj(At)dj = φvt.
6
These results can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Each firm nj uses the whole available knowledge, and the in-
stantaneous market value of one unit of knowledge (v˜t) is a given percentage,
φ, of its social value (vt). That is
A
nj
t = At for all nj
and v˜t = φvt , with 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 and vt =
∫ 1
0
Nj∑
nj=1
vnj(At)dj
In section 3.2 and 3.3 below, we will consider two differents organizations
of the market for knowledge. In each case, we will obtain a specific expression
for the market value of one unit of knowledge at date t , V˜t.
6In the present model, innovators appropriate only a part of the social value they
create, that leads to under-investment in research : see below. This is consistent to
empirical studies. For instance, Jones and Williams [11] estimate that actual investments
are at least four times what would be socially optimal.
16
3.1.3 Behaviors and basic results
In this section, we examine the behavior of agents, and we compute some
equilibrium prices.
The representative individual maximizes (10) subject to the budget con-
straint b˙t = rtbt + wt −
∫ 1
0
pjtcjtdt (bt is the per-capita wealth, and we know
that wt = 1). One gets the following standard results. The inverse total
demand function for consumption good j is
pjt = (LEt)
1−θ(Cjt)θ−1, (11)
where Cjt = Lcjt, and Et = (
∫ 1
0
pktcktdk)/(
∫ 1
0
(pkt)
θ/(θ−1)dk).
The Ramsey-Keynes rule is
rt = (1− θ)gcjt + [1−
1− ε
θ
]gΩt + ρ+ gpjt , (12)
where Ωt =
∫ 1
0
(cjt)
θdj.
The profit of firm nj (without the payment of knowledge) is the sum of
the profit on the production activity, pjtYnjt − wtLYnjt, and the profit on the
research activity, V˜tλσAtLAnjt − wtLAnjt. Since Ynjt = AtLYnjt and using (11),
this profit can be written:
p˜injt = Ynjt[(LEt)
1−θ(
Nj∑
nj=1
Ynjt)
θ−1 − 1/At] + V˜tλσAtLAnjt − LAnjt.
The first-order condition with respect to Ynjt gives
[(LEt)
1−θ(Yjt)θ−1 − 1/At] + (θ − 1)(LEt)1−θ(Yjt)θ−2Ynjt = 0 (13)
which implicitly yields the best response of firm nj, Ynjt, to the choice of
production of the other firms in sector j.
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The first-order condition with respect to LAnjt yields
V˜t = 1/λσAt (14)
saying that the selling price of one unit of knowledge, V˜t, is equal to its
marginal cost, 1/λσAt.
The marginal profitability of one unit of knowledge, that is to say the in-
stantaneous willingness to pay for this unit is vnjt = ∂p˜injt/∂At = Ynjt/(At)2+
V˜tλσL
A
njt
. Since Ynjt = AtLYnjt and V˜tλσ = 1/At, one gets
vnjt = (L
Y
njt
+ LAnjt)/At. (15)
Therefore, the instantaneous willingness to pay by all firms in the econ-
omy for one unit of knowledge, that is the instantaneous social value of one
unit of knowledge is vt =
∫ 1
0
(
∑Nj
nj=1
vnjt)dj = (L
Y
t + L
A
t )/At, that gives
vt = L/At (16)
Using (11), in which Cjt = Yjt, (13) becomes (pjt−1/At)+(θ−1)pjtYnjt/Yjt =
0. Assume that all firms in sector j are identical, that implies Ynjt/Yjt = 1/Nj.
Then, one gets pjt = 1/At[1 + (θ − 1)/Nj].
Since 0 < θ < 1, pjt is a decreasing function of Nj, and lim
Nj→ +∞
pjt = 1/At
(i.e the marginal cost). If Nj = 1, we have pjt = 1/θAt, which is the standard
result in the monopoly case. We see also that pjt is a decreasing function of
θ: the mark-up on the marginal cost decreases when the price-elasticity of
the consumption goods demand increases.
Now let us assume that all sectors are symmetric, i.e Nj = N for all j.
Then we have
pjt = pt =
1
At(1 +
θ−1
N
)
, ∀j ∈ [0, 1]. (17)
The results concerning prices are summarized in the following proposition.
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Proposition 5 In the weightless economy with Cournot competition in all
consumption goods sectors, and partial exclusion on the knowledge market,
prices are
v˜t
pt
= φL(1 +
θ − 1
N
),
V˜t
pt
=
1
λσ
(1 +
θ − 1
N
),
wt
pt
= At(1 +
θ − 1
N
).
Since we have normalized the wage wt to one, we have divided all prices by
pt to compare the results to the first-best ones given in proposition 3 (in which
we have pt = 1). One gets v˜t/pt < (vt/pt)0 = L, V˜t/pt < (Vt/pt)0 = 1/λσ,
and wt/pt < (wt/pt)0 = At. On account of Cournot competition and partial
exclusion, the prices of knowledge and of labor are lower than the first-best
ones, with convergence when the number of firms in each sector increases.
However, as it is studied below, the number of firms is endogenous and finite
because the payment of knowledge by firms appears as a fix cost, and because
their profits must be non-negative.
3.2 Destructive creation with knowledge goods
In section 2.2.1, we have analyzed the standard (“à la Aghion-Howitt”) equi-
librium in the tangible economy. In this equilibrium, the monopoly on an
intermediate good disappears when this good is replaced by a new one: it
is the destructive creation mechanism. The purpose of this sub-section is to
extend this analysis to the case of the weightless economy.
Now, in each sector, the firm which has obtained the last innovation em-
bodies this innovation in a knowledge (or information) good. As Aghion
and Howitt, we assume that it has a monopoly on this good until an inno-
vation occurs in this sector. Thus the value at t of one unit of knowledge
is V˜t =
∫∞
t
φvse
− ∫ st (ru+λLAu )duds, that gives after differentiation rt + λLAt =
gV˜t +φvt/V˜t (note that we consider the symmetric case, where L
A
j = L
A, ∀j).
Let us now calculate the rate of growth of the output (we continue to
assume that all sectors are symmetric).
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From (14), V˜t = 1/λσAt, we have gV˜t = −gAt , that gives at steady state
r + λLA = −gA + φ(L/At)λσAt = −gA + φλσL, in which we know that
λLA = gY /σ.
In the symmetric case, (12) becomes r = ρ+εgY +gp. From (17), we have
gp = −gA, that gives r = ρ + εgY − gA. Plugging this expression of r in the
previous equation gives ρ+ εgY − gA + gY /σ = −gA + φλσL, and thus
gY =
φλσL− ρ
ε+ 1/σ
. (18)
We see that gY is an increasing function of φ : the more firms can extract
on each unit of knowledge, the more they put in research, that spurs growth.
However, even if φ = 1 (perfect exclusion and thus total extraction of
surplus) the equilibrium growth rate is lower than the optimal one, given by
g0Y = (λσL − ρ)/ε (see proposition 3). This result is different from the one
obtained by Aghion and Howitt in the tangible economy (see also proposition
1) along with the laissez-faire growth may be greater or lower than the opti-
mal one. In fact, in the tangible economy, the innovator extracts a surplus
on the demand of the intermediate good in which its idea is embodied: this
surplus can be higher or lower than the value of the idea. On the contrary,
in the weightless economy, it extracts directly a part of this social value. We
know that the length of life of knowledge goods is finite in average, when
ideas are infinitely-lived. That is why, even if φ = 1, the rate of growth is
sub-optimal.
We can now calculate the number of firms in each consumption good
sector. The profit of a firm before the payment of knowledge is p˜i = (pY−LY+
V˜ λσALA − LA)/N. Since V˜ λσA = 1 from (14), we have p˜i = (pY − LY )/N.
The price paid for each firm for one unit of knowledge is V˜ /N. Thus, the
firm pays V˜ λσALA/N = LA/N to buy knowledge. Then, its total profit is
pi = p˜i − LA/N = (pY − LY − LA)/N = (pY − L)/N. If there is free entry,
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one gets pY − L = 0. Using (7), (17) and (18), one obtains
N =
(ε+ 1/σ)(1− θ)
φ− ρ/λσL . (19)
N is a decreasing function of φ. An increase in φ means that innovators
can appropriate a greater amount of the willingness to pay for knowledge. We
have seen that growth is stimulated (see (18)), but simultaneously the cost
supported by firms to buy knowledge increases. That is why their number
decreases. We see also that an increase in θ, i.e. an increase in the price-
elasticity of consumption goods demand, leads to a decrease in N. Indeed,
when θ increases, the profit which allows to fund knowledge decreases. That
is why the number of firms decreases in the free entry equilibrium.
Remark : if A˙t = λσAtLAt /Lt and L˙t/Lt = n, one gets goc = goA =
(φλσ−ρ)/(1+1/σ), goY = goc +n and N = (1− θ)(ε+1/σ)/(φ−ρ/λσ). Scale
effects disappear and the number of firms at equilibrium does not depend on
the size of the population.
3.3 Infinite patents on knowledge
Instead of patents on knowledge goods (which disappear when the good is
replaced), we now examine an equilibrium in which patents would be directly
given to the knowledge embodied in this good. The basic difference is that
these patents are infinitely-lived: the innovator receives a payment for an
idea, even when the associated knowledge good has disappeared. Then, the
value at t of one unit of knowledge is V˜t =
∫∞
t
φvse
− ∫ st rududs, that gives after
differentiation rt = gV˜t+φvt/V˜t. Since vt = L/At (see (16)), and V˜t = 1/λσAt,
(see (14)), one gets at steady-state r = −gA + φλσL. From (12), we have at
steady-state r = ρ+ εgY + gp, where gp = −gA (from (17)). Finally, one gets
the equilibrium rate of growth
gY =
φλσL− ρ
ε
(20)
which is lower than the optimal one, g0Y = (λσL− ρ)/ε (see proposition 3).
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Note that if φ = 1, that is to say if there is total extraction of the
willingness to pay by each innovator (i.e. perfect exclusion), the equilibrium
is optimal despite the Cournot competition in consumption goods markets.
Basically, on account of Cournot competition, the real wage is At(1 + (θ −
1)/N) (see proposition 4), which is lower than the optimal one, w0t = At (see
proposition 3). However, since the supply of labor is assumed exogenous,
there is no distorsion on the labor market. Clearly, in a model with an
elastic labor supply, the equilibrium would not be optimal.
As previously, we can also calculate the number of firms in each consump-
tion good sector. Here also, the free entry condition leads to pY − L = 0,
where p = 1/A[1 + (θ − 1)N ] (see (17)) and Y = ALY (see (7)). From (20),
we have gY = gA = λσLA = (φλσL − ρ)/ε that allows to compute LA, and
thus LY = L−LA = L− (φλσL− ρ)/ε. Plugging this result in the free entry
condition, one gets
N =
ε(1− θ)
φ− ρ/λσL. (21)
Note that, here also, an increase in φ or in θ leads to a decrease in N :
the interpretation is the same than in the previous case.
Remark : if A˙t = λσAtLAt /Lt, and L˙t/Lt = n, one gets goc = goA =
(φλσ− ρ)/ε and N = ε(1− θ)/(φ− ρ/λσ). Here also, scale effects disappear
ant the number of firms does not depend on the population size.
4 Conclusion
The rise in importance of new technology industries leads to a progressive
dematerialization of the economy. Using the terminology of this paper, one
progressively moves from a tangible economy to a weightless one. The im-
plication for economic growth models is that ideas (i.e. new knowledge) are
embodied in knowledge goods, which are non rival, rather that in private
intermediate goods.
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The purpose of this paper was to extend the Schumpeterian growth theory
to the case of a weightless economy. In the latter, since tangible interme-
diate goods have made way for weightless knowledge goods, one cannot use
the standard equilibrium concept of growth theory; on the contrary, the chal-
lenge is to propose a new concept, in which knowledge goods (or, eventually,
knowledge) are directly priced.
First, we have proposed a formalisation of knowledge accumulation which
is slightly different from the Aghion-Howitt’s one, and we have shown that
it can be easily used to analyse the case of a tangible economy.
Second, in the weightless economy, we have analyzed an equilibrium with
Cournot competition and free entry in consumption goods markets, so that
firms can buy knowledge (or knowledge goods) despite the non-convexity of
technology. In this equilibrium, the real wage and the price of knowledge are
lower than the optimal ones, because the price is higher than the marginal
cost on consumption goods markets. Then, we have studied the case of
“destructive creation”, that is to say the case in which the monopoly on a
knowledge good disappears when this good is replaced by a new one: we
have shown that the output growth rate is always lower than the optimal
one, contrary to the result obtained by Aghion-Howitt in a tangible economy.
We have also studied the case where infinitely-lived patents directly protect
ideas (rather than knowledge goods which embody them). In this case, the
equilibrium is optimal if firms are able to extract the total willingness to pay
for each unit of knowledge, in spite of the prices distorsions caused by the
Cournot competition.
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Appendix A : Standard (“à la Aghion-Howitt”)
equilibrium
In the final good sector, the maximisation of the profit piYt = (LYt )1−α
∫ 1
0
Ajtx
α
jtdj−
wtL
Y
t −
∫ 1
0
qjtxjtdj leads to
(1− α)Yt/LYt − wt = 0 (A.1)
and α(LYt )
1−αAjtxα−1jt − qjt = 0. (A.2)
In each intermediate good sector j, the profit is pijt = qjtxjt − yjt, where qjt
and yjt are respectively given by (A.2) and (5). After maximisation, one gets
xjt = α
2
1−αLYt , qjt =
Ajt
α
, and pijt = α
1+α
1−α (1− α)LYt Ajt. (A.3)
The sum of the present values of the expected profits in sector j at date t is
Πjt =
∫∞
t
pijse
− ∫ st (ru+λLAju)duds. Differentiating with respect to time gives
rt + λL
A
jt =
Π˙jt
Πjt
+
pijt
Πjt
. (A.4)
Now we use the usual free entry condition, wt = λΠjt, and we consider the
symmetric case in which xjt = xt, Ajt = At, LAjt = LAt , pijt = pit,Πjt = Πt.
Using (A.1) and the free entry condition, we obtain Πt = (1−α)α
2α/(1−α)
λ
At,
that gives gΠ = gA. Using this result and (A.3), we get pit/Πt = λαLYt .
Let us now consider the steady-state, in which LA (and thus also LY ) are
constant. Using (3) and (4), we have gΠ = gA = gY = λσLA. Thus (A.4)
writes r+ λLA = gY + λα(L−LA), that gives r = λαL+ gY (1− (1 +α)/σ).
From the maximisation of utility, we have r = ρ + εgc, where gc = gY . One
gets finally
gY =
λαL− ρ
ε− 1 + (1 + α)/σ ,
and all the results given in proposition 1.
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Appendix B : Welfare analysis in the tangible
economy
The Hamiltonian of the social planner’s program is:
H =
c1−ε − 1
1− ε e
−ρt + µ
[
(LY )1−α
∫ 1
0
Aj(xj)
αdj − Lc−
∫ 1
0
Ajxjdj
]
+
∫ 1
0
ηj
(
λσLAj
∫ 1
0
Ahdh
)
dj + ν
(
L− LY −
∫ 1
0
LAj dj
)
.
The first-order conditions ∂H/∂c = 0, ∂H/∂LY = 0, ∂H/∂LAj = 0, and
∂H/∂xj = 0 yield
c−εe−ρt − µL = 0 (B.1)
µ(1− α)Y/LY − ν = 0 (B.2)
ηjλσA− ν = 0 (B.3)
α(LY )1−αxα−1j − 1 = 0 (B.4)
Moreover, ∂H/∂Aj = −η˙j yields
µ
[
(LY )1−αxαj − xj
]
+
∫ 1
0
ηjλσL
A
j dj = −η˙j (B.5)
From (B.4), we have xj = x = α1/(1−α)LY , ∀j, that implies Y = A(LY )1−αxα,
and thus gY = gA at steady-state.
Log-differentiating (B.1) and (B.2) with respect to time gives −gµ = εgc+ρ =
gA − gν .
From (B.3), one gets ηj = η = ν/λσA, ∀j, and gη = gν − gA.
From (B.5), we have (µ/η)[(LY )1−αxα − x] + λσLA = −gη.
Using (B.2) and (B.3)to compute µ/η, the first term on the left hand side
is equal to λσLY . Moreover, we know that −gη = −gµ = εgc + ρ. Thus, one
gets
gc = gY =
λσL− ρ
ε
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Now, in order to compute the prices which sustain the optimum, we
examine the behavior of the different sectors.
In the final good sector, the profit is piYt = (LYt )1−α
∫ 1
0
Ajtx
α
jtdj − wtLYt −∫ 1
0
qjtxjtdj. The maximisation of piYt with respect to LYt and xjt gives
(1− α)Yt/LYt − wt = 0 (B.6)
and α(LYt )
1−αAjtxα−1jt − qjt = 0. (B.7)
Moreover, the marginal profitability of one unit of knowledge Ajt is
vYjt =
∂piYjt
∂Ajt
= (LYt )
1−αxαjt. (B.8)
In any sector i, the expected profit in the research activity is piAit =
VitλσAtL
A
it − wtLAit. Indeed, if labor LAit is engaged in research on inter-
val (t, t + ∆t), the probability to get an innovation is λLAit∆t and, in this
case, the increase in knowledge is σAt. The free entry assumption gives
VitλσAt − wt = 0, that implies7
Vit = Vt =
wt
λσAt
, ∀i. (B.9)
The marginal profitability of one unit of knowledge Aj is vijt = ∂piAit/∂Ajt =
VitλσL
A
it = wtL
A
it/At. Thus, the total marginal profitability of one unit of
knowledge Aj in the whole research sector, vAjt =
∫ 1
0
vijtdi, is
vAjt = v
A
t = VtλσL
A
t =
wt
At
LAt , ∀j. (B.10)
Finally, in the intermediate sector j, the profit is pixjt = xjt(qjt−Ajt). Since
there is now perfect competition, the price is equal to the marginal cost:
qjt = Ajt. (B.11)
7In fact, condition (B.9) is the classic optimality condition for a public good first derived
by Samuelson [21, 22]: see for instance Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [14]. Indeed, Vit
is the sum of the present values of users’ marginal benefits from one unit of knowledge,
and wt/λσAt = wtLAit/A˙it is the cost of this unit.
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The marginal profitability of one unit of knowledge Aj in this sector is
vxjt =
∂pixjt
∂Ajt
= −xjt. (B.12)
This marginal profitability is negative because an increase in Aj leads to
an increase in the cost of production of the intermediate good xj (see (5)).
It is now easy to compute the equilibrium solutions.
From (B.7) and (B.1), one gets xjt = xt = α1/(1−α)LYt , for all j, that
is the optimal production of intermediate goods. Thus (4) becomes Yt =
(LYt )
1−αAtxαt = α
α/(1−α)AtLYt , and (B.6) gives wt = (1− α)αα/(1−α)At.
From (B.9), one gets Vt = (1 − α)αα/(1−α)/λσ, that implies gV = 0.
From (B.8) and (B.12), we have vYjt = vYt = αα/(1−α)LYt and vxjt = vxt =
−α1/(1−α)LYt .
Then, at steady-state, the basic arbitrage condition r = (vY +vA+vx)/V
becomes r = λσLY
1−α + λσL
A − αλσLY
1−α = λσL. Since r = ρ + εgY from the
household behavior, one gets gY = (λσL − ρ)/ε, that is the optimal rate of
growth.
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